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WHY DID THE GREEK POLIS ORIGINALLY
NEED COINS?

Why did the ancient Greek polis originally need coins? This question, so
simple to pose and so difficult to answer, leads to more specific queries such as
what practical purposes coins served in the polis and what messages they
communicated either explicitly through their types and legends or implicitly by
their very creation as products of the political community of the polis. In
previous work in a related area of the intersection of Greek history and numismatics I concluded that assertions of a direct link between an abstract notion of

sovereignty and what is sometimes today called the "right of coinage" are

anachronistic when applied to classical Greece.' This earlier work concerned
primarily the interruption or complete cessation of coining by classical-period
Greek city-states that had traditionally minted their own coinages. Its conclusions were that the evidence did not support the idea that powers such as Philip

II of Macedon in the fourth century B.C. or Athens in the fifth compelled their
subjects or allies to cease minting coins as a demonstration of the latters' lack of
sovereignty compared to the formers' assertion of it and as a suppression of
local coinage seen as a self-conscious symbol of a state's political identity.

Rather, I argued, financial pressures best explained interruptions and cessations
in minting, as, for example, when a polis was too impoverished to secure a
supply of silver or when the need for locally-minted coinage was obviated by

the appearance in circulation of widely-accepted coinages produced by another
mint.

This argument thus produced negative conclusions concerning what coinage was not for the polis, what it did not signify or symbolize in a political

sense. In his stimulating re-examination of the consequences that the reign of
Philip II of Macedon had on the coinage of Greek city-states, Olivier Picard
points out the need to go further than I did originally and to think about the

complementary side of the question: what did coinage represent in and for the
polis, or, to put the question more abstractly, what was the political significance

of Greek coinage?2 He rightly emphasizes that coinage has "juridical aspects"

I Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece (Princeton 1985). For arguments from the
perspective of a modern political scientist also rejecting the idea that the classical Greeks
had a conception of sovereignty corresponding to modern notions, see F. H. Hinsley,
Sovereignty (2nd ed. Cambridge 1986) 1-44.
2 "Philippe II et le monnayage des cit6s grecques," REG 103 (1990) 1-15, who replies to
Historia, Band XLV/3 (1996)
? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart
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and is linked to nomos and therefore to civic autonomy (in the Greek sense of a

polis as a political community that makes its own laws).3 That is, he postulates
a strong connection between coinage and the political nature of the community.
What, then, might this connection be? In what ways did coinage have a political

significance in the Greek polis?
It is possible to offer one approach to this complex question by investigat-

ing the connection between coinage and the polis as an internal affair, as a
matter interior to a single polis, rather than as a matter of economic" or power or
diplomacy between states, as in my previous work. Furthermore, it seems
reasonable to hold as a premise of the investigation that this connection had its

roots in the earliest history of coinage in the polis, which of course does not

mean that the original reasons for the adoption of coinage by city-states necessarily remained the only reasons that they continued to mint coins over the

succeeding centuries. Coinage, like other technological innovations, surely had

unintended consequences over the long run. In any case, speculation (and that is
all our evidence allows) about the perhaps diverse reasons why Greeks living in
city-states originally adopted the use of coinage seems an appropriate way to
begin thinking about the multi-faceted issue of the significance of archaic and
classical Greek coinage in and for the polis as a political community. Why,
then, did the Greek polis originally need coins?
The current consensus among ancient historians and numismatists seems to

be that the state's need for a convenient medium of exchange to pay for official
expenditures motivated the initial adoption of coinage in the Greek polis. That

is, the earliest coinages in Greece were intended to serve the fiscal needs of the
state. In the words of Chester Starr, early issues of coins were "occasioned by
public needs of the polis, which were varied."4 On this view, providing a
Sovereignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) in so far as it pertains to Philip of Macedon and
Greece. He argues that the disappearance of coinages with local types reflects "une
meilleure connaissance des techniques financieres" (p. 15) on the part of the cities rather
than poverty or an interdiction by a more powerful entity. For further discussion of the

effect of Philip's reign on Greek coinage, see Catharine C. Lorber, Amphipolis. The Civic

Coinage in Silver and Gold (Los Angeles 1990) 57-76.

3 "Philippe II" (as in n. 2) 7-9. Pace Picard, I am not persuaded that the connection between
nomisma and nomos vitiates my financial interpretation of the Athenian Coinage Decree

in Sovereignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) 196-207, in favor of one that sees Athens as
purposely limiting the autonomy of its allies. For one thing, the decree on "weights,

measures, and decrees" in Ar. Av. 1040-1041 that Picard cites as a parallel to Athens'
instructions to its allies in the Coinage Decree does not evoke a similar context. The new
laws ( 1037) that the "decree seller" pitches to the birds are being offered to a community

devoid of laws, not as a replacement for or suppression of existing laws in an "autonomous" community. The parallel does not hold because the allies of Athens already had
their own laws.

4 The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece 800-500 B.C (New York 1977) 1121 17 ("Purposes and Significance of Coinage"), with references to earlier scholarship.
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medium of exchange for commerce and trade per se was not an important

motive for the original adoption of coinage by the Greeks.5 A concern for
revenue may have been a motive, however, because recent research suggests
that some city-states in Magna Graecia adopted the use of coinage as a way to

increase their revenues by creating a closed system with a lighter weight
standard so that they could profit by the exchange of heavier foreign coins for
those of their system, just as the Ptolemies did much later.6
"Public needs" of a practical kind, however, are not seen as the whole story

behind the adoption of coins by Greek city-states. Civic pride is also prominently adduced as a fundamental motive for their having begun to mint coins. The

strongest statement of this position came two decades ago from M. I. Finley,
who ascribed to the ancient Greeks a "passion" for coins that "was essentially a
political phenomenon, ,a piece of local vanity, patriotism or advertisement with
no far-reaching importance' (the Near Eastern world got along perfectly well

for millennia, even in its extensive trade, with metallic currency exchanged by

weight, without coining the metal)."7 The basic tenet of Finley's influential

5 Even Oswyn Murray, Early Greece (2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1993) 237-240, who
thinks that the importance of trade in the early uses of coinage is underestimated, seems to

regard the connection as an indirect one stemming from coinage's advantages for ac-

counting. His view that Greek cities in particular appreciated this advantage of coinage
when they first adopted its use lends general support to the interpretation presented later
in this paper.

Modern economic historians seem inclined to maintain the view that coinage did come
into existence to serve trade and commerce, postulating that coinage evolved, "without

government intervention, to facilitate the process of exchange" (apparently meaning
commercial transactions rather than exchange in an anthropological sense). See, for
example, Angela Redish, "Coinage, development of," in New Palgrave Dictionary of
Money and Finance I (London 1992) 377.

Ancient authors offer mixed opinions on this topic. Hdt. 1.94.1 implies that he saw

money as an invention to be used in commercial exchange. (Cf. Martin, Sovereignty and

Coinage [as in n. 11 214-215.) Aristotle does not, I think, say the same thing in his most
famous discussion of coinage (Pol. 1257alO-bl9), although he is usually cited to this
effect. His comments on the relationship between exchange and justice in Eth. Nic.

1 1 33a6-b 1 8 (cf. [Mag. Mor.] 1 194a) must be taken into account in understanding what he
says in the Politics. More complex still is what to make of what Plato says at Resp. 368e372e on exchange as the origin of the city and the impetus for coinage to be used in trade.

I discuss these passages in "Coins, Mints, and the Polis," in M. H. Hansen (ed.), Sources
for the Ancient Greek City-State (Copenhagen 1995) 257-291.

6 Georges Le Rider, "A propos d'un passage des Poroi de X6nophon: la question du change
et les monnaies incuses d'Italie du Sud," in Georges Le Rider et al. (eds.), Kraay-

Morkholm Essays (Louvain-La-Neuve 1989) 159-172. On Ptolemaic Egypt, see Martin,
Sovereignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) 225-226 and the references there.
7 The Ancient Economy (2nd ed. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1973) 166. Finley is here
quoting J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money. Vol. 1. The Pure Theory of Money (New York
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view continues to be restated in more recent scholarship. In the revised version
of the Cambridge Ancient History, for example, Chester Starr provides a
summation of what has usually been the standard view on this point: one of the

reasons that Greek cities began to mint coins was "no doubt to advertise the
growing pride and power of the minting poleis."8 The notion that coinage
functioned as a symbol of autonomy is an analog to this view, for example, as
expressed by Helmut Engelmann. In his view, coinage in the Greek world was
from its first appearance "ein politisches Phanomen .... Die Autonomie einer

Stadt war greifbar und sichtbar in ihrem Geld."9 Similarly, M. M. Austin

stresses pride as a motive for archaic Greek states beginning to issue coins by

asserting that "coinage was a symbol of statehood and political identity ....
Coinage was in general a matter of considerable pride, and this may help to

explain its rapid spread among the majority of Greek cities from the sixth
century onward."10 Philip Brook Manville carries the argument a step further by

relating coinage to a concern on the part of the polis to create a symbol to
represent a "self-conscious image."' 1 This last statement attributes an extremely powerful symbolic significance to Greek coinage in a political context,
implying that Greek city-states minted coins for the same reason that modem
states produce, for example, national flags, namely, to function as symbols of
sovereign identity and serve in political rituals.'2

1930) 12. To gain an idea of the level of the intellectual and cultural presuppositions of
Keynes' theorizing, which he bases on his "Illustrations from History," one must quote
the context of the words extracted by Finley: "When the kings of Lydia first struck coins,

it may have been as a convenient certificate of fineness and weight, or a mere act of
ostentation appropriate to the offspring of Croesus and the neighbors of Midas. The
stamping of pieces of metal with a trade-mark was just a piece of local vanity, patriotism
or advertisement with no far-reaching importance. It is a practice which has never caught

on in some important commercial areas .... The Semitic races, whose instincts are keenest

for the essential qualities of Money, have never paid much attention to the deceptive
signatures of Mints, which content the financial amateurs of the North, and have cared
only for the touch and weight of the metal."

8 CAH III, 3. The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C. (2nd ed.
Cambridge 1982) 431. Similarly, in his earlier book, Economic and Social Growth (as in
n. 4) 114, he had cited "pride" as a motive for Greek states commencing to coin (citing
Duby on the practices of early medieval kings as a parallel). In his more recent discussion

of the emergence of Greek coinage in Individual and Community. The Rise of the Polis

800-500 B.C. (New York 1986) 72-73, this motive does not appear.
9 "Wege griechischer Geldpolitik," ZPE 60 (1985) 165.
10 "Greek Trade, Industry, and Labor," in Michael Grant and Rachel Kitzinger (eds.),
Civilization of the Ancient Mediterranean. Greece and Rome II (New York 1988) 734.
1 1 The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens (Princeton 1990) 171.
12 For a discussion of symbolism and rituals in politics of the kind that flags can serve, see

David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven, Conn. 1988) 2-8.
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These opinions correspond to what I would call the "politics as pride"
interpretation of the political significance of the coinage minted by Greek city-

states from the beginning."3 Should we accept this interpretation as a supplement to the idea that archaic Greek city-states adopted the use of coinage to
serve their "public needs?" In the remainder of this paper I want to explain why
I think the evidence suggests a negative answer to this question and what I think

the evidence does suggest concerning the synergistic relationship that developed between the use of coinage and the "public needs" of the polis as it
increased in scale, became increasingly urbanized, and developed a physical,
social, and political infrastructure that occasioned increasingly impersonal
transactions among citizens.

No direct numismatic evidence exists to support the "politics as pride"
interpretation because no ancient coinage explicitly proclaims that its existence
13 Analogous assumptions underlie, for example, the view that Alexander the Great minted
his coinage to assert his sovereignty. See A. B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire. The

Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge 1988) 244: "Undoubtedly Alexander's primary
intentions [with his coinagel were political, to produce an empire-wide coinage declaring
his universal monarchy. Expressions of local autonomy were discouraged, but as usual

there is no set pattern .... Alexander's coinage ... was predominant, a universal currency
that was uniquely and explicitly his." Otto M0rkholm, by contrast, Early Hellenistic

Coinage. From the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336-188 B.C.)

(Cambridge 1991, Philip Grierson and Ulla Westermark [eds.I) 23, while rejecting the
idea that Alexander had any "far-sighted economic policy" in mind, explained Alexander's huge production of coins as a response to his military and civil expenses.
Naturally, a Macedonian monarch may have attributed quite different political signifi-

cance to his coinage than did a polis, but in my opinion the case remains unproved that
Alexander "discouraged" Greek coinages as "expressions of local autonomy;" see Sovereignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) 122-131. The situation in the Hellenistic period becomes

much more complicated. It is commonly held that Hellenistic kings restricted or suppressed the "right of coinage" of less powerful entities as a manifestation of superior
sovereignty. This interpretation is usually buttressed by reference to Maccabees I, 15.6,
in which Antiochus VII is quoted as granting Simon Maccabeus pernission "to mint

coins for your own country." Antiochus gives no explicit justification for his power to
control coinage; it presumably stems from his power as a king to control everything that
happens in his realm, if he wishes. It seems to me much more likely that considerations of

profit rather than sovereignty per se induced Hellenistic monarchs to restrict the production of non-royal coinages when they saw an advantage in doing so. (See Martin,

Sovereignty and Coinage [as in n. 11 242-243.) As Barclay Head observed many years
ago, Historia Numorum. A Manual of Greek Numismatics (New York 1911) lvii, the
"right of coining money" was monopolized because such a "useful invention" was
"recognized as a source of considerable profit." J. K. Davies, CAH VII, 1. The Hellenistic
World (2nd ed. Cambridge 1984) 280, concludes that the profitability of coinage led to
monopolies, which in turn led to coinage becoming associated with sovereignty: "... since

minting was profitable, all kings followed the Athenian fifth-century example and attempted to control coining within their own territories, to the point where the issue of

tetradrachms was a symbol of sovereignty maintained ... or autonomy conceded ..."
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is meant to express pride in the identity
autonomy.'4 Perhaps, however, it is asking too much to require that a symbol

overtly label itself as such and unfair to expect explicit testimony from Greek
coins that they were intended to serve as symbols of pride. Perhaps all we
should expect is that the fact of their existence offers implicit testimony to their
status as markers of civic pride. Even on this latter condition, however, the

argument seems difficult to maintain as currently stated because, if an important motive inducing a polis to start minting coins was pride or the assertion of
identity, it is extremely remarkable that, on Chester Starr's estimate, more than

half the known Greek city-states appear never to have minted any coins at all.'5
It seems impossible to believe that more than fifty percent of all Greek city-

states had such poor self-images or severe identity crises that they forbore
minting coins.

In fact, only one piece of ancient evidence is usually cited as supporting the

"politics as pride" interpretation of the significance of coinage in the archaic
and classical polis, and this evidence is Hellenistic: a late second-century B.C.

inscription from Sestos in the Thracian Chersonese.16 The inscription bestows
honors from the demos on a rich and prominent citizen by the name of Menas.
One of the actions for which Sestos honored Menas was his official service

when the city decided to create its own bronze coinage.'7 M. M. Austin

14 M0rkholm, Early Hellenistic Coinage (as in n. 13) 24, for example, must argue that very

small city coinages in the Hellenistic period were "most probably produced on some
occasion when it was found opportune to propagate the fact of the independence and
freedom of the city" because these exiguous coinages "can have had very little economic

significance." But the fiscal needs of small ancient cities, whose populations could be
tiny, may have been quite exiguous by our standards - but not by theirs - on particular
occasions when coinage was needed or desired. If, for example, mercenaries whom a citystate needed to hire for protection demanded their pay in fresh coin and the city-state had

no easy access to other supplies of coinage, it might on this pressing occasion resort to
temporary production of its own coinage minted from worn coins of other states found in

local circulation and then melted down for reminting. Or, short runs of coins may have
represented failed attempts to profit from minting by creating a new coinage. Whatever

the plausibility of these particular examples, many Greek cities issued coinages that were

of no "economic significance" on an international scale but did have such significance on
the local level. And the decision to mint coins was based on local financial reasons in the
vast majority of Greek states that ever coined, in my view.

15 Individual and Community (as in n. 8) 46-47. I discuss this phenomenon further in my
paper "Coins, Mints, and the Polis" (as in n. 5).
16 OGISI,no.339.

17 OGIS I, no. 339, lines 43-51: ... roi. 're xo jou Xrpoe XO 'VO vol?i tp

Xpf(oOat i&iot, Xaptv ToV3 vogtevre-eoOat cn v Tr6v 'ri n6Xto% xapaK
XucrtTeX?k5x6 TOeptyetv6gevov ?K ri' TOQaiYT; nrpoa6Soio XaIpdvEtv r6
1CpoXE&putiaevO1) 'Oro; T'fV icrintv jOG ;5;'r Tcal &1Kaio) xnpfoavra;
965 ge'r& 'roi3 auvaco8et6X9v'ro; Trv ica"KOrouaav eiavvevKa?o ntVXet
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translates the section concerning Menas and coinage as follows: " ... and when

the people decided to use its own bronze coinage (idion chalkinon nomisma), so
that the city's coin type (character) should be used as a current type (nomeiteuesthai), and the people should receive the profit (to lusiteles) resulting from
this source of revenue, and appointed men who would safeguard this position of

trust (pistis) piously and justly, Menas was appointed and together with his
colleague in office showed suitable care (epimeleia), as a result of which the
people, thanks to the justice (dikaiosyne) and emulation (philotimia) of these

men, has the use of its own coinage, and in the other magistracies and liturgies

to which the people had appointed him, he has shown himself impartial (isos)
and just (dikaios)...."'.8

When the Sestos text is cited in support of the "politics as pride" interpretation of coinage, the reference is customarily confined to the two clauses "so that

the city's coin type should be used as a current type, and the people should
receive the profit resulting from this source of revenue." The conclusion is then
drawn that production of a bronze coinage for the city had two separate aims
expressed by the two clauses. For example, Ian Carradice and Martin Price have

recently explained the clauses as saying that Sestos meant "to boost its selfesteem [i.e., the first clause] as well as to provide a fair profit to the treasury

[i.e., the second clause]."'9 I have previously argued against this sort of interpretation on the grounds that the two clauses are in fact linked in thought not as
two antithetical points separate from one another but rather with the second
point (garnering revenue) implicitly deriving from the first (putting a local

coinage into circulation).20 I remain persuaded that the text says nothing about
the introduction of coinage providing civic "self-esteem" and therefore does not

support the idea that the political nature of Greek coinage was a matter of
"politics as pride." Rather, this inscription only tells us that Sestos desired its

own bronze coinage because the coinage produced income for the city (assuming that Sestos was going to impose a currency monopoly in its territory of the

8igoq S&a tv tov avbpov &icatoavosviv T? Kai 0tXortqiav Xpfrxat rt6 iiot vo,uiagaxt,

?V re talt; di apxatc; Kcai Xerot)pyiat;, ci; aS; 6 S1o0 ao&T6v XpoKeXeiptvUat,
?iaov awuT6v icat &catov napeiCoilTat ...
18 The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest. A Selection of Ancient

Sources in Translation (Cambridge 1981) no. 215, lines 43-5 1.
19 Coinage in the Greek World (London 1988) 122. Cf. Christopher J. Howgego, "Why did

ancient states strike coins?," NC 150 (1990) 20, citing the Sestos inscription as proof that
pride was a factor in a city-state's decision to create a new coinage.
20 Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) 238-241 (with references to earlier scholarship on the decree). Clauses linked by men and de, as these two are, do not have to express
a strong antithesis. In the words of J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (2nd ed. Oxford

1966) 370, "[slometimes giv ... &9 conveys little more than te ... Kai."
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kind attested elsewhere).2' This profit was

chresima) that the inscription praises M

resources on behalf of the city in his suppo

city" (ta koina).22 In other words, Menas s
city to support its "public needs."

The contribution that this Hellenistic inscription makes to understanding

the political significance of archaic and classical Greek coins comes precisely
from this wider context of its mention of coinage. So far as coinage is concerned, the demos of Sestos praises Menas for his pious and just service, which
has allowed the city to profit. As the inscription reveals, Menas demonstrates
his eusebeia, his dikaiosyne, and his philotimia by "safeguarding his position of
trust (pistis)" concerning coinage. The piety presumably refers to the placing of

images of divinities on the city's coinage, while the justice Menas displayed
probably refers to his making sure that fraud did not eat away the city's profits

from minting.23 His self-esteem is the quality that induces him to serve his
community as zealously, virtuously, and generously as possible. The context, in
other words, is that of a wealthy and virtuous citizen performing leitourgiai for

the benefit of the entire civic community.24 Coinage thus is located squarely in
the liturgical tradition of the Greek city-state as a source of revenue in support
of ta koina. This context was certainly a political one in various senses because

it fell within the nexus of social and moral relationships between richer and
poorer citizens in a polis, in which wealthier citizens were expected, indeed
socially and morally obliged, to expend their wealth and their personal efforts
to benefit their fellow citizens. That spending and that service were supposed to
demonstrate piety and justice on the part of the individual benefactor, as the text

21 As at Olbia, Pergamum, and (presumably) Gortyna, for instance; see Martin, Sovereignty
and Coinage (as in n. 1) 208-214, 240; Inscriptiones Creticae IV, no. 162. None of the
evidence from these places explicitly expresses any concern other than making a profit.

22 OGIS I, no. 339, lines 7-8, 88, 91.

23 The bronze coinage of Sestos to which the inscription refers bore images of several
deities, especially Demeter and Hermes. See Head, Historia Numorum (as in n. 13) 261.
For the argument that Greeks in the archaic period felt a strong association between the
types of their coins and the power of the gods, see Jean Bayet, "Iddologie et plastique (I):

l'expression des Energies divines dans le monnayage des grecs," in Ideologie et plastique
(Rome 1974) 499-544.

24 For a brief summary of the types of formal liturgies in Greece and Rome, see the article

"Liturgy" by A.H.M. Jones in the Oxfiord Classical Dictionary (2nd ed. Oxford 1970)
613. His emphasis on liturgies being "compulsorily conferred" applies far more to the
later Roman empire than to the Greek city-states and should not be construed to mean that

citizens of the latter were usually reluctant to perform liturgies. For more extended
discussion, see art. "Leiturgie" by J. Oehler in RE XII (1925), cols. 1871-1879. For more
recent discussion, see also Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric,
Ideology, and the Power of the People (Princeton 1989) 128, 195 with n. 5, and 199-202.
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says, while providing concrete and common benefits to the community as a
whole.

The return or profit, as it were, to the individual on pious and just expendi-

ture of this kind would be, first of all, a reputation as a proper and contributing
citizen, the kind of reputation that was necessary above all in defending oneself

in court. In some cases, if his benefactions were sufficiently splendid and his
service excellent, a rich man's contributions would also earn him fame as a

great man (doxa and euphemia) and election to high public office.25 But even
the "rich quietists," who wished to stay out of the limelight and shunned the

public visibility to be gained through office-holding and speechmaking, also
had to make some benefactions and fulfill the occasional liturgy, if only to
provide themselves with a defense in law suits tried before juries of their fellow
citizens.26

Except insofar as it helped him resist any temptation to profit fraudulently
from his position as a mint official, Menas' wealth was not in fact directly
relevant to his particular service regarding coinage because the production of
coinage was a source of income to the city rather than an expenditure, as the
inscription makes plain. But coinage in general does lie at the heart of the
context outlined by this inscription because the text describes numerous other

benefactions to the city that Menas personally financed.27 Coinage, in other
words, facilitated his proper participation in the polis, his fulfillment of the role
he played in his civic community, because he used coins to provide benefac-

tions to his city in keeping with the Greek tradition of the wealthy supporting
"public needs."28
Although he is not directly concerned with this tradition, Robin Osborne's

recent discussion of exchange in fourth-century Athens makes an important
related point by demonstrating how wealthy citizens needed coinage to live the

lives required of them by the social and political norms of the classical polis. He

25 For the fame that Menas garnered, see OGIS I, no. 339, lines 8-10, 31.
26 See L. B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian (Oxford 1986) 99-130.
27 Carradice and Price, Coinage (as in n. 19) 122, are mistaken in saying that one of Menas'

benefactions was "to pay for the production of the city's bronze coinage." The text clearly
says that he is being praised for overseeing the minting with justice and piety and that the
production of coinage was a source of profit, not an expense needing to be paid by a

benefactor. At most, I suspect, Menas may have provided funds to get the mint started, for

example, by hiring a public slave and acquiring the necessary tools, but the inscription
does not say this. When Menas paid for a benefaction, the text says so, as in the

immediately preceding lines (42-43), which indicate that he himself paid for a dedication
(of weapons) that the city had voted in his honor.

28 For a useful brief summary of the background and operation of the liturgical tradition in
this context, see Vincent Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet. Public Taxation and

Social Relations (Baltimore and London 1994) 7-8 with the references to earlier scholarshipinn. 13 on p. 230.
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29 "Pride and prejudice, sense and subsistence: ex
John Rich and Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (eds.),
(London 1991) 119-145.

30 "Pride and prejudice" (as in n. 29) 140.
3 1 Per. 16.

32 A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles (Chapel Hill, North Carolina 1989) 198-199.
33 Plut. Per. 10, 16.
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which they pursued their political ambitions in the council and assembly and
defended their property and status in the courts, while the country was the
source of their income. By turning their income from the country into cash, they

could conveniently make the benefactions and perform the liturgies that gave
them political capital, capital that they could spend both on offense, as it were -

to secure the votes of their fellow citizens for high office and for support of
proposals to the assembly - and on defense - to secure the votes of fellow

citizens when their enemies or sycophants attacked them with law suits.

To be sure, it was not necessary, strictly speaking, for coinage to exist in

order for this sort of social-political system to exist, which imposed both formal
and informal financial obligations on citizens. Ambitious politicians such as

Pericles could theoretically have operated in similar ways in a community that
had money only in other forms, such as bullion or objects of barter. But in

Greece, I am postulating, the adoption of coinage had a direct connection to the

evolution of the tradition that obligated wealthier citizens to contribute to the
well-being of the entire city-state (a tradition that would eventuate in, among

other results, the liturgical system enforced by law). Thus, coinage functioned
as an essential mechanism in the evolving political structures of the Greek polis
at this early stage of development.
The connection between coinage and what might for present purposes be

called a proto-liturgical tradition arose in the sixth century B.C. when funda-

mental changes affected the basic conditions of life in the polis. One signal
change was increasing urbanization. A relationship between urbanization and

the use of coinage has long been noticed.34 For one thing, the specialization of
labor that cities promoted meant that day-to-day commercial exchange was
more convenient with coinage as a medium.35 But urbanization as a spur to the

34 See, for example, Starr, Economic and Social Growth (as in n. 4), ch. V ("Cities and

coinage"), and Individual and Community (as in n. 8) p. 70.
35 On Greek urbanization before the Persian wars, see Roland Martin, L'urbanisme dans la
Grace antique (2nd ed. Paris 1974) 75-96. Developments obviously took place at a
different pace in different places, and our archaeological knowledge is insufficient to

permit strict generalizations in any case. But the sixth century, especially its latter half,
was a period when, as at Athens, the pace of urbanization seems to have markedly
increased. Exchange using coinage in the early Greek city-state, it should be added, was
probably significantly different from exchange based on currency in most of the contem-

porary Western world. For one thing, it is usually assumed that early Greek coinages

tended to lack the small denominations that modern currencies offer. (This assumption
may be faulty; the apparent lack of small coins may be a result of their being more likely
to have been lost in antiquity and less likely to be found today. And some early coinages
did have small denominations, as Carmen Arnold-Biucchi of the American Numismatic
Society has shown in her work in progress on the early coins of Selinus: "The Beginnings
of Coinage in the West: Archaic Selinus," in Florilegium Numismaticum. Studia in
honorem U. Westermark edita [Stockholm 19921 13-19.) Greeks without small denomi-
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specialization of labor is by itself an insufficient cause for the adoption of
coinage in the Greek polis because cities had existed for millennia without
coinage in the Near East.36 Rather, urbanization accompanied by a new form of
communal organization and the resultant new expectations for the behavior of
wealthier individiuals in the community provided a favorable context for the
emergence of coinage in the world of the Greek polis.

Compared to the ancient Near East, the early Greek polis constituted a new
form of organization lacking a central authority like a king to compel by force
the payment of revenues by the members of the community but nevertheless
including an emerging public infrastructure that demanded large-scale financial
support. The monarchs of the ancient Near East were accustomed to compelling

agricultural producers, workers of all kinds, and the upper class to provide
goods, services, and capital to the state as needed or desired. These kings could
therefore simply order their subjects to provide the resources, whether as

capital or labor or both, needed to support the public infrastructure of their
communities.

The developing Greek city-state had an analogous need for resources to
support a growing public infrastructure, both physical and social. The creation
of cities in Greece reconfigured physical space by creating common areas and
buildings which no single individual owned or was responsible for and also by

creating an essential and extensive infrastructure on which all depended for
survival in common, above all the urban water supply. The need to provide the
public infrastructure necessary to bring sufficient water to urban areas called
for construction of aqueducts, systems of pipes, and fountains in central loca-

tions. These particular public properties also required on-going maintenance -

nations - or even with them - most likely would have customarily "run a tab" with local
merchants that they would settle from time to time with coinage as payment, in much the

same way that people in our world, especially in smaller communities, frequently did
until relatively recently, when new forms of payment and credit became commonplace.
36 Furthermore, pace Finley, The Ancient Economy (as in n. 7) 107, coinage had a place in
the economy of the country as well as the city, or, perhaps one should say, a place in the
relations between country and city. Ar. Ach. 33-36, could give the impression that country

folk did not need or use coinage, but that situation could apply only to self-sufficient
farmers in isolation from others, who by the classical period probably existed only in
idealizing fantasies. In real life the situation was more complex. Aristotle, for instance,
tells the story of city people going to the country to buy things, fresh fish in this case (fr.

517 Rose = Ath. 8.348a-c, from the Politeia of the Naxians). On merchant-middlemen
buying produce from peasants in the country and then bringing it to the city for resale, see

Thomas W. Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece. Reconstructing the Rural
Domestic Economy (Stanford, Calif. 1991) 100. Christopher Howgego, "The Supply and

Use of Money in the Roman World," JRS 72 (1992) 20, remarks on the considerable
quantity of coin found in rural areas.
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cleaning out of sediments and repairing of leaks - on an unprecedented scale.37

Analogously, the development of a civic center went hand-in-hand with the
increasing development of large-scale, community-wide events to take place in

public space, especially sacrifices and festivals, that went beyond the customary local celebrations serving the needs of restricted groups. This reconfiguration of physical space and of the calendar of public events entailed a reconfiguration of social and financial relations in the city-state by creating shared

responsibilities among citizens for expensive public needs. These responsibili-

ties could only be met by devising mechanisms on which citizens agreed
because the city-state lacked a central authority such as the monarchies of the

ancient Near East, where the king or property-owning priesthoods were the
owners of "public buildings" and "public spaces" and directly controlled and
directed the expenditure of the resources of goods and labor that were called for
to build and maintain these properties and hold celebrations in and around

them. The increasingly urbanized city-states of Greece had no such central
mechanism of coercion, except perhaps occasionally in some tyrannies, other
than decisions of the citizen-body backed by legislation. Tyrants who ruled by
force could perhaps use coercion to order buildings to be built and civic
property to be maintained and festivals to be paid for by citizen contributions.
By contrast, cities ruled by tyrants like Pisistratus, who tried to rule without

changing the laws, as Thucydides put it,38 and cities governed by oligarchies
and democracies had no such power of overt coercion to force citizens to pay
financial contributions or provide labor for civic projects. They had to rely on
consensus among the citizens.
37 On the crucial importance of securing a supply of water in the process of Greek urbanization and the needs that it imposed on the polis, see Dora P. Crouch, Water Management in
Ancient Greek Cities (Oxford 1993) and Martin, L'Urbanisme (as in n. 35) 63-66. For
Athens, see J. McK. Camp, The Water Supply of Ancient Athens (Diss., Princeton
University 1977); R. Tolle-Kastenbein, Das archaische Wasserleitungsnetz fur Athen

(Mainz am Rhein 1994); Michael Stahl, Aristokraten und Tyrannen im archaischen
Athen: Untersuchungen zur Uberlieferung, zur Sozialstruktur und zur Entstehung des

Staates (Stuttgart 1987) 241. The growing importance of public water supplies in the later
archaic period is apparently reflected in art: black figure painters in the later sixth century

began to produce many, many pictures of fountains. See T. Leslie Shear, "Tyrants and
Buildings in Archaic Athens," in Athens Comes of Age: From Solon to Salamis (Princeton
1978) 11.

On the development of the concept and reality of public property in the polis, see David
Lewis, "Public Property in the City," in Oswyn Murray and Simon Price (eds.), The Greek

City from Homer to Alexander (Oxford 1990) 245-263. As he points out, the earliest
relevant use of the adjective demosion in this meaning comes in Solon fr. 4. H. A.
Shapiro, "From Athena's Owl to the Owl of Athens," in Ralph M. Rosen and Joseph

Farrell (eds.), Nomodeiktes. Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald (Ann Arbor,
Mich. 1993) 213-224, dicusses the meaning of the inscription demosios on a late archaic

amphora.
38 6.54.
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Lacking a central authority to compel contributions or labor through the
threat of force, the urbanizing Greek city-state had to find other ways to pay for

and to maintain the common structures and services of its ever more complex
physical and festal infrastructure. As the Menas inscription implies, one way
lay in the development of a proto-liturgical tradition, by which the rich contributed personally to the financial needs of the city.39 This tradition probably came
about only gradually and after much strife between rich and poor, at least if the
histories of Draco and Solon at Athens are any clue to general conditions in the

archaic polis in this regard. Eventually, however, a political connection of the
town to the country manifested itself in the obligation, eventually enforced by

law, of wealthy landowners to distribute their wealth widely to their fellow
citizens via benefactions and liturgies to pay for new "public needs" of the
community. This process occurred when the degree of urbanization was reached

at which it became necessary, if a community was to exist as a sizable polis
rather than just a village, for the wealthy, who would increasingly have a
residence in the city as well as lands and a home in the country, to extend their

obligations beyond the boundaries of their neighbors in the country to the
citizen-body as a whole.

Coinage would have proved especially helpful in satisfying the needs of
this emerging tradition in several ways.40 One was by making it easier for

wealthier citizens to benefit a larger number of others than they could by
"payments in kind." Out in the country where their lands lay, wealthy landown-

ers certainly had obligatory benefactions to make to their local community,

such as to the deme in the Athenian system, but because of the limited scale
involved in most cases these rural obligations could have been fulfilled satisfac-

39 For discussion of the process by which the rich moved beyond largess to their local group

(whether deme or tribe or whatever) to outlays potentially touching the entire citizen
body, see Paul Veyne's analysis of what in his discussion of "pre-euergetism" he calls a

tontine, in Bread and Circuses. Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism. Abridged
with an introduction by Oswyn Murray. Translated Brian Pearce (London 1990) 71-101.

Cf. Gabrielsen, Financing (as in n. 28) and Ober, Mass and Elite (as in n. 24). On
"communal patronage," see Gallant, Risk and Survival (as in n. 36) 148.
40 ltdouard Will, "De l'aspect dthique des origines de la monnaie," RH 212 (1954) 209-231,
and "Reflexions et hypotheses sur les origines du monnayage," RN 7 (1955) 5-23, long
ago pointed out that coinage emerged at the same time that the process began whereby
patterns of behavior developed through which the community's resources were to some

extent recirculated from rich to poor. Cf. his "Fonctions de la monnaie dans les cites
grecques de l'epoque classique," in J.-M. Dentzer et al. (eds.), Numismatique antique.
ProblWmes et mithodes (Nancy and Louvain 1975) 233-246. Building on Will's argu-

ments, Thomas Figueira, Aegina. Society and Politics (Salem, New Hampshire 1986)
111, has pointed out in his treatment of the early coinage of Aegina how coinage, once it

reached what he calls the stage of prevalence, facilitated, among other things, "certain
patronage functions of the aristocracy."
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torily and without undue trouble by means of produce, without coins being

needed.41 A sacrifice and feast, for example, for one's fellow demesmen in a
relatively small deme could come directly from the annual production of a
single rich land owner's herds, gardens, orchards, and vineyards. The situation

changed, however, once it became expected and, eventually, obligatory for
wealthy men to make disbursements in the city beyond these "local liturgies" in
the country. In a large polis, for example, there was no question of one man

regularly sacrificing enough beasts and providing enough produce from his

own holdings alone to feast the whole population as a function of his high

status.42 But with the help of coinage he could, if he had stored up sufficient
monetary assets, at least treat a large number of people by buying provisions
from others, as apparently the Athenian general Chabrias did for a time in the
fourth century. To celebrate his naval victory over the Spartans off Naxos in

376 B.C., he provided wine every year for participants in the celebration of the
second day of the Great Mysteries.43 More commonly, richer citizens would use
wealth accumulated as coinage to pay for services or sacrifices or construction

that benefited the community as a whole and thus win popular renown.44
This process was surely at work in Athens during the tyranny of Pisistratus,
who won his power over aristocratic opposition essentially by extending his
patronage beyond theirs onto a polis-wide scale.45 Coinage supported this
process of seeking support among the mass of the population. That is, Pisistratus tried to assemble for himself from the citizens of the polis what amounted to
a very large group of clients for whom the tyrant was the patron. Coinage would
have served an essential role in this process because this patronage was on such
a large scale. Scale is the issue. An aristocrat in the country had clients on a
relatively small scale, drawn from the peasants and tenants in and around his
estates. He would have known who they were and have been directly involved
in their lives as a fellow participant in local festivals, as a host of communal

feasts, as a source of a friendly loan of a tool or some seed or even some capital,
an arbitrator for disputes, and so on in the matters of daily life. The scale of
things was sufficiently small that the patron would have been known personally

41 For a discussion of how patron/client relations worked in the Greek countryside, see
Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece (as in n.36) 159-169.
42 In smaller communities this might be possible on occasion, though certainly not as a

regular phenomenon. See IG 17.7.389 (Aigale on Amorgos); SIG3 708 (Istropolis).
43 Plut. Phoc. 6.

44 See Xen. Oec. 2.5-6 for some of the obligations of a rich man at Athens.

45 On the Pisistratid tyranny in general, see, conveniently, Helmut Berve, Die Tyrannis bei
den Griechen (Munich 1967) 41-77; A. Andrewes, CAH III.32 (1982) 392-416. For a

thorough discussion of the competition between Pisistratus and other aristocrats for status

and wide support among the citizen body via patronage of religious activities, art, and
architecture, see Stahl, Aristokraten und Tyrannen (as in n. 37).
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and festivals, he could not personally loan a hoe or an ox or a bag of seed to so

many clients, and so on. The larger scale and greater impersonalization of
Pisistratid patronage and clientship made coinage a very useful, perhaps almost
necessary mechanism for maintaining the relationship between patron and

client in a time of change, when people were more and more no longer dealing
with each other on the same intimate scale of personal relationships as in earlier

times. Coinage, in other words, permitted Pisistratus to develop his expanded
implementation of patron/client relationships in a way that other, earlier, more

personal forms of exchange could not so easily allow, at least not in a way that
was practical under the new circumstances of growing urbanization in the midsixth century.

Coinage naturally also suited Pisistratus's new strategy for meeting the
fiscal needs of the city - his system of taxation - and his personal need for

defense, which he met by hiring mercenaries. As H. W. Parke said long ago,
echoing Herodotus, Pisistratus "rooted his tyranny with many mercenaries and

much revenue."47 The increasing importance of trade through the port of the

city of Athens also made coinage a welcome innovation in Pisistratid Athens,
although obviously not because coinage was absolutely necessary to carry on
sea-borne commerce. Rather, like patronage on a community-wide scale, trade
on an international scale was also part of the growing impersonalization of life

in the archaic polis.48 Foreign trade conducted with coinage suited a more
impersonal world far better than did transactions employing goods for barter.
Barter required the determination of the value of the goods being exchanged by

a process of face-to-face negotiation that would frequently have been filled

with doubt, tension, and even fear.49 For the confidence that made exchange by

47 Greek Mercenary Soldiers. From the Earliest Times to the Battle of lpsus (Oxford 1933)

8-9. See the numerous references to Pisistratus and chremata in Hdt. 1.59-64. For
Pisistratus's creation of a system of direct taxes, see Thuc. 6.54.5 and Arist. Ath. Pol. 16.4
with the comments of P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia

(Oxford 1981) 215. On taxation and coinage in general, see Robert J. Littman, "Greek
Taxation," in Grant and Kitzinger (eds.), Civilization (as in n. 10) 11, 797. In the context
of raising revenue, fines were analogous to taxes, and coinage suited this context perfectly. See, for example, the Eretrian inscription from the third quarter of the sixth century
that specifies the payment of fines in chremata dokima: L. H. Jeffery, The Local Scripts of

Archaic Greece (Oxford 1961) 84, no. 9A1.
48 Cf. the remarks of Arist. Pol. 1257a31-33.

49 For provocative remarks on the "climate of fear" that probably surrounded much ancient

trade, see David Braund, Georgia in Antiquity. A History of Colchis and Transcaucasian
Iberia 550 B.C. - A.D. 562 (Oxford 1994) 78, and J.-P. Morel, "Greek Colonization in

Italy and the West (Problems of Evidence and Interpretation)," in T. Hackens, N. D.

Holloway, and R. R. Holloway (eds.), Crossroads of the Mediterranean: A Conference at

Brown University, 1981 (Louvain and Providence, Rhode Island 1983) 149-150. For the
suggestion that the uncertainty inherent in commercial trading had a powerful effect in
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barter work well, some knowledge of the other party was highly desirable,
especially knowledge concerning the trustworthiness of the person. This personal knowledge helped establish the value of the goods being exchanged.
Coinage shifted responsibility for the guarantee of value in exchanges away
from the immediate parties to transactions, at least for the party accepting
coinage in an exchange, and thus made it easier for strangers to do business. In
the country, as opposed to the city and its port, there were comparatively few
strangers, and exchanges could be primarily face-to-face encounters among

people who knew of each other and could have some reliable estimate of the
value of the goods the other party offered as money in exchanges. The more
impersonal transactions of the city and port were aided by coinage. Above all,

from the point of view of the tyrant, coinage made it easy to collect import/
export dues in the harbor.

Another practical way in which coinage probably facilitated the "public
needs" of an increasingly urbanized and impersonal polis was in the pooling of
resources to pay for projects that were beyond the ability of individuals to bear,

such as, to use a later example, the common sacrifice for which the Athenian
statesman Phocion claimed he could not pay his contribution (epidosis) because
of his indebtedness. He advised asking for contributions from the rich, presum-

ably in analogous fashion to the way Greek city-states raised voluntary contributions from citizens for a variety of needs and then recorded these virtuous
donations in public view.50 Under this sort of cooperative system, if the entire
cost of a public service or a construction project could not be paid by a single

individual, contributions from different citizens could be pooled with each
other to make up the necessary total of funds. The use of coinage made it much
easier to do this sharing of financial burdens in a way that ensured fairness and
ease of accounting. And ensuring fairness and preventing cheating or underpay-

ment would have been on contributors' minds at such times, as Plato implies

transforming traditional social values in European history, see Donald McCloskey, "Bour-

geois Virtue," The American Scholar (Spring 1994) 187.
Edward E. Cohen, "The Athenian Economy," in Ralph M. Rosen and Joseph Farrell
(eds.), Nomodeiktes (as in n. 37) 198, describes the fourth-century Athenian economy as
one "in which unrelated individuals, often in the city only transiently, sometimes even
operating from abroad, sought monetary profit through commercial exchange." Mutatis
mutandis, this unsettling context for exchange arose much earlier in the history of larger

city-states such as Athens, at the time when financial transactions began to take place
more and more among citizens who did not know each other as neighbors.

50 Plut. Phoc. 9. On sorts of projects supported by voluntary contributions, see Leopold
Migeotte, Les souscriptions dans les cites grecques (Geneva and Quebec 1992) 327-345.
Cf. Ober, Mass and Elite (as in n. 24) 199-202 on epidoseis in this context. For the
financing of walls, see also F. G. Maier, Griechische Mauerbauinschriften II (Heidelberg
1961) 18-21, 55-68.

This content downloaded from 38.111.224.10 on Mon, 13 Mar 2017 13:36:44 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Why Did the Greek Polis Originally Need Coins? 275

when he has Thrasymachus say that in the relations of the just man and the
unjust man with the polis in matters such as epidoseis, the unjust man finds a

way to pay less from an equal basis than does the just man.51 As units of
established and guaranteed value, coins made it much simpler to be certain that
a man was paying his allotted portion of the shared costs of a project than if the
value of each share had to be calculated in kind, which would certainly have

meant agreeing on values among different kinds of produce and so on. Doing
such calculations concerning payments in kind would have been extremely
complicated. A decree from the sanctuary of Oropos gives a glimpse of how
cumbersome procedures could be under these conditions. The officials are

obligated to record all donations that the sanctuary receives, they have to weigh
everything that is not in the form of coin, and they have to put up an inscription
for public inspection that specifies the amounts that each donor gave by weight

(and by the plethos of coins). Payments made entirely in coin would have

greatly lessened the sort of onerous accounting to which this decree testifies.52
One can also imagine that relying on payments in kind for pooled contribu-

tions or shared financial responsibilities would have provoked bitter disagreements among citizens as they made their payments, especially in as disputatious
a community as the average Greek polis (if one can extrapolate from the

peevish personality types frequently depicted by Aristophanes, or by Theophrastus in the Characters). If contributors paid their allotted share by bringing
in beasts, for example, arguments would surely have broken out concerning the
relative worth of animals. How would it be fair, someone would complain, if
that man over there was allowed to contribute a sick old animal while he

himself had fulfilled his responsibility by contributing a healthy young one
worth far more? Arguments of this sort would have been inevitable and, one
guesses, constant, whether the issue was the value of animals or different
qualities of produce such as grain or olives or wine. It might seem culturally

limited to think that the polis necessarily needed or wanted to adopt innovations
to lessen these sorts of disputes, except that such disputes involved considerations of justice and equity in the relations among citizens, and these were

certainly fundamental concerns of the new form of social and political organi-

zation of the polis (regardless of how well these concerns were actually implemented in practice). The use of coins as payments obviated much of the
problem of ensuring fairness in contributions. By counting and recording coins
one could know precisely the value of each man's payment and be sure that he
had made the appropriate and equitable contribution.

Moreover, the use of coinage made it much easier to pay workers (whether

51 Resp. 343d.

52 IG VII, no. 303.
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citizens, metics, or public slaves) over the

maintained public infrastructure, the "th

koina) of the sort referred to in the Men

could, for example, arrange to pay labore
work proceeded in a satisfactory fashion
Furthermore, the polis could accumulate

give the workers their pay and keep it se
unlike animals or produce, coins did not die or spoil and were easy to store.
(The corollary, of course, was that they were easier to steal than bulky foodstuffs used as money and consequently required additional security measures.)
Coins also offered convenience compared to weighed bullion because there was
no need to argue about their value or the amount that they represented, as there

would have been with raw metal cut into pieces or other goods. The building
inscriptions from Athens and Epidauros demonstrate that Greek city-states did
a great deal of complicated and public accounting of payments.54 This sort of

financial transaction could theoretically of course have been done in kind
indefinitely, as they were in the ancient Near East.55 But, in the absence of an
undisputed central authority like a Near Eastern monarchy to keep disputes to a
minimum, the increasingly urbanized and impersonal Greek polis could ill
afford the burden imposed by taking in revenues only through payment in kind,

which had the same disadvantages as barter: "le troc primitif suppose une
discussion parfois fort longue sur la valeur des biens 6chang6s ....56
By improving the process of making payments and receiving revenue and
by making accounting and recording far more efficient and (potentially, at
least) more accurate, coinage in a practical way promoted the goal of securing

justice through exchange in transactions among citizens and foreigners that
Plato and Aristotle insisted was necessary if a polis was to be a polis.57 Coinage

was thus, like the alphabet, "'an enabling innovation."58 The benefits that
coinage brought to an expanding polis, which was largely administered by nonspecialist citizens rotating in and out of office, made the use of coins virtually a

necessity once political, social, and financial life achieved a certain (unfortunately unquantifiable) level of complex interaction.

53 OGIS 1, no. 339, lines 88, 91.

54 For the records, see IG 12, nos. 373-374 (= 13, nos. 475-476); Burford, The Greek Temple
Builders (as in n. 46) 85-87.

55 See, for example, the way in which amounts in kind are specified by weight in a public
inscription of around 500 B.C. from an unknown polis in Crete: L. H. Jeffery and A.
Morpurgo Davies, "A new archaic inscription from Crete," Kadmos 9 (1970) 118-154.
56 Will, Fonctions (as in n. 40) 234.
57 Resp. 368e-372e; Eth. Nic. I I 33a6-b 18.

58 Barry Cunliffe, "Cities, States, and the Transformation of Europe," in Barry Cunliffe
(ed.), Origins. The Roots of European Civilization (Chicago 1987) 83.
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Coinage thus served as the ideal medium for gathering contributions, pay-

ments, taxes, and fines and then disbursing this revenue to pay for ta koina as
the city-state developed a greater need for this level of financial transaction. It
is a fitting juxtaposition of urbanization and coinage that Plutarch, presumably
reflecting his earlier sources, mentions that Theseus minted a coinage for
Athens immediately after he has reported how Theseus created an urban center

for the new city that his synoecism had brought into existence.59 The coinage
and built-up urban center attributed to Theseus are fictions, of course, but the
connection between the two phenomena is not.

Another development in the history of the late archaic polis that possibly
promoted the adoption of coinage was the creation of Greek civic navies. The

chronology and scope of early Greek navies remain extremely uncertain and
controversial, but it seems possible that some Greek city-states began to build at
least a limited number of warships that belonged to the state, rather than to
individuals, at approximately the same time that they were developing the

proto-liturgical tradition of contributions by citizens toward public expenses.
Herodotus implies just such a chronological connection, for example, when he
reports that the Aeginetans created an early liturgy (a choregia to honor the

statues of divinities stolen from the Epidaurians) after they began to build
ships.60 It is usually argued that the ships constituting the earliest Greek navies,
at least in large part, did not belong to the city-states, properly speaking, but

came as loans from private owners.61 Even if it is plausible to think that private
citizens actually built and maintained ships and crews suitable for war, owned
them in sufficient numbers to be able to constitute a navy of any useful size for

a polis, and were ready and able to loan these private vessels equipped with

59 Thes. 24-25.

60 5.83.1. The precise date, which in any case is not relevant to a possible connection
between the emergence of a proto-liturgy and publicly-owned ships, is no earlier than the

late seventh century. Cf. Figueira, Aegina (as in n. 40) 174.
61 See, for example, Starr, Individual and Community (as in n. 8) 56, and H. T. Wallinga,
Ships and Sea Power Before the Great Persian War. The Ancestry of the Ancient Trireme
(Leiden 1993) 8, who argues that civic navies hardly existed before the Persian Wars and
that few city-states owned significant numbers of triremes before that date. Vincent
Gabrielsen, Financing (as in n. 28) 24-26, emphasizes that the navies of Greek city-states

in the late archaic age are to be understood with "a concept of 'navy' that is structurally
and quantitatively quite different from the 'national' navy created later on" because early
navies relied on privately-owned ships and not on "a formal, all-embracing network of

obligations comparable to the later liturgical system ..." I agree with his argument (pp. 3034) that the development of civic navies was a long, gradual process. I have elaborated an
earlier version of my ideas on coinage and the development of Greek civic navies in a
paper forthcoming in the proceedings of the Eleventh Naval History Symposium held in
Annapolis, Maryland, in October, 1993.
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crews to the state for naval campaigns and

that by the late archaic period a competiti

be maintained by marshaling privately-ow

could still be constituted from hoplites pr
this time a sufficiently sizable and technologically advanced navy could no
longer be generated from the small supply of men rich enough to provide an
entire warship solely from their own resources. Rather, constructing a goodsized navy in the later sixth century would presumably have required collecting
taxes and also perhaps pooling contributions from citizens, just as in the midfifth-century Athenian empire small allied states that could not afford individu-

ally to provide an entire ship chipped in cash that was pooled by Athens to buy
ships, or as in the later Athenian syntrierarchy system.62 It seems reasonable to

think that one of the ways in which Greek city-states originally began to build

up state-owned fleets was to have citizens pool contributions to pay for the
construction of some of the city's ships. Very few city-states would have been
as fortunate as Athens became once the strike at Laurion in the 480s paid for
more ships out of public revenues obtained without levies on citizens.63
A convenient medium for collecting taxes and for pooling revenues to
finance naval construction costs would have been especially welcome as warships in the late archaic period became larger and more complex and thus more

costly.64 Although it is perhaps not impossible that this process could have
taken place indefinitely without the presence of coinage, by the use, for exam-

62 On the syntrierarchy, see Gabrielsen, Financing (as in n. 28) 173-176.

63 For the strike being used to pay for ships, see Hdt. 7. 144; Arist. Ath. Pol. 22.7; Plut.
Them. 4.

64 Rhodes, Commentary (as in n. 47) 151, suggests that the obscure institution of the
naucraries was organized to gather citizen contributions for supplying and maintaining

the city's warships. Cf. Manville, Origins of Citizenship (as in n. 11) 75, n. 23. V.
Gabrielsen, "The naukrariai and the Athenian navy," C & M 36 (1985) 21-51, and
Financing (as in n. 28) 20-24, argues that the sources do not show a connection between
the naucraries and the fleet. For references to the copious previous literature, see Borimir

Jordan, The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1975) 516, to which can be added Thomas J. Figueira, "Xanthippos, Father of Pericles, and the
Prutaneis of the Naukraroi," Historia 35 (1986) 257-279, and Wallinga, Ships (as in n. 61)

16-32. See J. S. Morrison and J. F. Coates, The Athenian Trireme (Cambridge 1986) 2541, and Chester Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History (New York 1989)
21-22, on the development of ships with rams, two-level warships, and triremes. See now

Wallinga, Ships (as in n. 61) passim on the trireme. The Athenian fleet was not numerous

at this point and consisted mainly of pentekonters, according to Thuc. 1.14, but it was
large enough for Athens to spare twenty warships to send to the aid of the lonians in 498

despite the hostilities ongoing with Aegina (Hdt. 5.97.3, 97.1, 6.49-50, 85-93). Athens
had at least fifty ships by the late 490s (Hdt. 6.89). See Gabrielsen, Financing (as in n. 28)

30-34, for a healthy corrective to excessive skepticism about the existence of any
Athenian navy worthy of mention before the later 480s.
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ple, of precious objects or bullion as media of exchange, the obvious utility of

coinage in this endeavor would have been given an enormous boost by the
complicated nature of the transactions required to gather materials and fittings
for complex warships and to pay the number of craftsmen with the many

different skills that would have been needed to build a fleet of such warships.65
As naval technology evolved in the archaic period, first the two-level ship and
then the trireme were developed, and any state wishing to compete in naval

power had to be able to finance a fleet of scores of these complex and expensive
vessels. In fact, the trireme, the most costly and complex of the classical-era
warships, may just have been appearing in Greek navies by the third quarter of

the sixth century, around the time when more and more Greek city-states were

beginning to mint coins.66
It would certainly be overly simplistic to claim that the development of
navies or indeed any other single phenomenon in the sixth century "caused" the

Greek city-states to adopt the use of coinage. Rather, the building of navies
through citizen contributions and the collection of revenues via taxes might
have been one part of the evolution of the patterns of liturgical-type behavior

and financial organization that came to characterize the classical polis and that
happened more or less at the same time as significant urbanization, which

meant large-scale common facilities, services, and activities to be paid for and
maintained with public funds. The point is that, for purposes of collecting,
pooling, and distributing financial resources for shared responsibilities such as
maintaining infrastructure or building civic navies or other goals of the developing polis, coinage was an essential device.
In sum, the process of the emergence of a tradition of patterns of public
behavior, such as the one that later crystallized into the liturgical system of the

classical polis, had a synergistic relationship to the process of adoption of

coinage in the archaic polis. In a sense, this development achieved, among other
things, a modification of the system of gift-exchange characteristic of aristo-

crats in the period before the emergence of the polis so that it could serve the
needs of a new kind of political community - the polis - in which the poor were
participants as well as the rich and in which the rich had obligations to the entire

civic community, not just to their fellow demesmen or clansmen.67 How sixth-

65 Large biremes with rams represented major projects in naval architecture, and triremes
even more so. On the materials and construction of the trireme of the classical era, see

Morrison and Coates, The Athenian Trireme (as in n. 64) 180-191. It is not known how
many men it took to build a trireme. See Burford, Craftsmen (as in n. 46) 64. Surely it
required a substantial crew.

66 See Starr, Influence of Sea Power (as in n. 64) 22. Wallinga, Ships (as in n. 61) passim,

agrees on the date but, as previously mentioned, argues that very few city-states had any
publicly owned triremes this early.
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century city-states secured revenues to

varied. Those with harbors could exact
or mineral resources to exploit, such as Attica's Laurion mines, could claim the
revenues as public, and those with tyrants like Pisistratus could institute direct
taxes on the population.68
In city-states such as Athens in which the expectation grew that rich
citizens were obligated to benefit the civic community as a whole, the wealthy
would have helped bear the cost of public expenditures. The formal system of

liturgies seems not to have been in place at Athens before the end of the sixth
century.69 It seems likely, however, that obligations analogous to liturgies had

commenced at an earlier date, perhaps in the Pisistratid period, and the practice

of organizing voluntary contributions by groups of citizens to pay for "public
needs" of the polis has been postulated to have begun in the archaic period.70 It

has even been suggested that Solon mandated sacrifices and feasts for the
common benefit.7' As already mentioned, Herodotus assigns an Aeginetan
liturgy to an early date.72 The costs of civic religion, which constituted activities that benefited the entire community materially as well as religiously, would

have been a significant expense, perhaps the major one, in the early city-state
and thus required the kind of financing that the proto-liturgical tradition was
meant to provide.73 The first celebration at Athens of the Panathenaic festival
on a grand scale, the Great Panathenaia, is traditionally dated to 566 B.C., and
the Great Dionysia is also usually assumed to have been organized in the midsixth century or somewhat later, perhaps by Pisistratus.74 In the fourth century

the expenses of the Panathenaia, such as cash prizes and sacrifices, were paid

67 For recent discussion of the ideology of gift exchange among aristocrats in archaic
Greece, see Leslie Kurke, The Traffic of Praise. Pindar and the Poetics of Social
Economy (Ithaca, New York 1991) 85-107. See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of
Practice. Translated Richard Nice (Cambridge 1977) 4-15, for anthropological and
theoretical perspectives on the practice.

68 Cf. A. French, The Growth of the Athenian Economy (London 1964) 50-52 (on Pisistratus); A. M. Andreades, A History of Greek Public Finance. Translated Carroll N. Brown,
I (Cambridge, Mass. 1933) 121 (on tyrants).

69 J. Oehler, s.v. "Leiturgie," RE XII, cols. 1871-1879; J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied
Families 600-300 B.C (Oxford 1971) xxv.

70 For the possibility of an early dramatic choregia, see Max Treu, "Eine Art von Choregie
in peisistratischer Zeit," Historia 7 (1958) 385-391. On the origins of voluntary contribu-

tions, see Migeotte, Souscriptions (as in n. 50) 307.
71 Manville, Origins of Citizenship (as in n. 11) 149.
72 5.83.3.

73 Andreades, Greek Public Finance I (as in n. 68) 228.
74 Jennifer Neils, Goddess and Polis. The Panathenaic Festival in Ancient Ath

ton 1992) 20-2 1; H. A. Shapiro, Art and Cult under the Tyrants (Mainz 1989

W. Parke, Festivals of the Athenians (Ithaca, New York 1977) 33-50, 125-1
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from public revenues, in particular income received from leases on publicly-

owned land.75 How festival expenses were paid in the sixth century is unknown.
To the extent that they may have been subsidized by contributions from wealthy

citizens in this early period, the contributions need not have been made in cash
in the earliest period of the celebration of large-scale public festivals. The
enormous sacrifices of the Panathenaia, for example, could have been provi-

sioned by wealthy landowners contributing animals from their herds, and the
olive oil that filled the prize amphoras could similarly have come from their
groves. The amphoras themselves presumably had to be purchased from craftsmen, who most likely did not figure among the rich. But eventually coinage
would have been just as useful in facilitating the financing of cult as in the other
areas of public interest already mentioned.
Coinage had a synergistic fit with emerging patterns of social and political
activity in the late archaic city-state in numerous ways besides any possible
utility for purely commercial transactions between individuals. Just as coinage

facilitated, for example, Pisistratus's creation of a large number of clients and
the imposition of a system of direct taxation, so, too, it supported the process
through which wealthy citizens began to make benefactions to the demos and
supply it with liturgical-type contributions and services. One might add that
coinage also would have served the needs of the rich by making it easier for

them to satisfy their desire for luxury goods, as Xenophon says,76 to make loans
to their friends as part of their social interactions, and to extend gifts to the poor

in times of famine and other crises.77
In these contexts the utility of coinage for the archaic Greek polis seems

undeniable, but in fairness one must be careful to distinguish between utility
and necessity. Neither the evolution in the archaic polis of a tradition obligating
the rich to make contributions and perhaps collaborate with one another to

perform or finance "proto-liturgies" for the benefit of the entire civic community, nor the development of systems of taxation, nor increases in trade absolutely

Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals of Athens (2nd ed. revised by John Gould
and D. M. Lewis, Oxford 1968) 57-101. W. R. Connor, "City Dionysia and Athenian

Democracy," Classica et Mediaevalia 40 (1989) 7-32, argues that the evidence is unreliable for dating the establishment of the Dionysia to the Pisistratid era; he thinks a later
date is preferable.

N. Yalouris, "Athena als Herrin der Pferde," MH 7 (1950) 52-54, suggested that all the

types of the earliest coins of Athens, the sixth-century Wappenmunzen, were associated
with the Panathenaia.

75 Parke, Festivals (as in n. 74) 35, 44, 47-48.
76 Vect. 4.9.

77 Austin, Greek Trade (as in n. 10) 742; Theophr. Char. 23.5-6; Antiphanes, CAF n, 1 1,

no. 228. Aristotle, who rejected liturgies as dangerously destabilizing in a democracy,
recommended that the rich give gifts of money to the poor to provide them with a start on

a productive existence (Pol. 1304b- 1305a, 1320a-b).
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depended on the existence of coinage.78 These trends could conceivably have

continued to evolve even if the Greeks had never adopted coinage, as human
ingenuity found ways to accommodate social and political needs with other
media of exchange. Nevertheless, all these phenomena together reinforced the

appropriateness of coinage in the development of the late archaic polis toward
its classical form.79 It is surely correct to say, therefore, that early coinage
served the "public needs" of the "state,"80 so long as one remembers that "state"
in the archaic period did not mean what it means in today's world of faceless
and self-perpetuating governmental structures. In the early polis, the "state"

was constituted by the decisions of citizens and the patterns of behavior that
they were developing in an emerging and novel political system. As Christian
Meier reminds us, there was no "state" divorced from society in this era, and the

polis was identical to the civic community.8' Coinage served the needs of
society in the civic community in what we call the early Greek polis. And since,
to quote Meier again, "the strict sense of the word political (politikos) became
,appropriate to the polis' ...," coinage was certainly a political phenomenon.
But it was not "political" in any simple way, and it was not produced to serve

any single aim. I see no evidence that it was originally produced to demonstrate
civic pride by standing as a symbol of sovereignty or independence.82 Coinage
was rather part and parcel of the complex of institutions that contributed to
making a Greek polis a polis by the classical period.83 Coins - nomismata -

78 The extent to which Greek trade became monetized is disputed. Contrast the views of
Murray, Early Greece (as in n. 5) with those of Austin, Greek Trade (as in n. 10) 739-740,

who quotes ancient sources to show exchange in international trade could and did
routinely take place without coins.

79 On this process of change, see Oswyn Murray, "Cities of Reason," in Oswyn Murray and
Simon Price (eds.), The Greek City (as in n. 37) 13.
80 See, for example, Starr, Economic and Social Growth (as in n. 4) 116, and Austin, Greek
Trade (as in n. 10) 734.

81 The Greek Discovery of Politics. Translated David McLintock (Cambridge, Mass. 1990)
3-4, 21.

82 If one is looking for symbolic representation of concepts central to polis identity, it would

be better to look elsewhere, for example to Roland Martin's idea that the agora symbol-

ized "l'independance et l'autonomie de la communautd politique" (L'Urbanisme [as in n.
35] 268) because the agora was used for rituals and behavior that reinforced the city's
sense of identity. Similar notions could be expressed by monumental architecture and art.
On Athena's owl as "the official emblem of city" in the context of the interpretation of the

inscription demosios next to an owl painted on a late archaic amphora as "a self-conscious

product of the young democratic state," see H. A. Shapiro, "From Athena's Owl" (as in n.

37) 213-224. Athens had an official public seal, which is attested as early as 397 B.C. See
Arist. Ath. Pol. 44.1 with Rhodes, Commentary (as in n. 47) 532.
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were indeed "things of nomos." They were mechanisms for the application of

nomos in constructing the life of the polis, in particular for central developments such as the emergence of the custom that rich citizens would contribute

financially in shared responsibilities for the benefit of the entire community.
This is one reason, and a central one, why the Greek polis originally needed
coins.84

College of the Holy Cross, Thomas R. Martin
Worcester, Mass.

83 Cf. the comments of Howgego, Supply (as in n. 36) 19, on studies of coinage and social
and political development in Gaul: "It looks as though the production of coinage and the
subsequent introduction of small denominations are indicative of stages in the development of towns."

84 In addition to the people who made helpful comments on versions of this paper delivered
in Calgary, New York, and Waltham, Mass., the following individuals deserve special
thanks: Carmen Arnold-Biucchi, Gregory Crane, William Metcalf, Blaise Nagy, Neel
Smith, and especially Kurt Raaflaub.
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